Kodak is a technology company focused on imaging. We provide directly and through partnerships innovative hardware, software, consumables and services. The Kodak Digital Camera System is a series of digital singlelens reflex cameras and digital camera backs that were released by Kodak in the 1990s and 2000s, and. Amazon. com Kodak Easyshare C613 6. MP Digital Camera with 3xOptical Zoom OLD MODEL Point And Shoot Digital Cameras Camera Photo. Buy a digital camera from Cameta Camera. Shop all major digital cameras brands for sale on the web or at our retail location in Amityville, NY. From the companys founding by George Eastman in 1. Kodak followed the razor and blades strategy of selling inexpensive cameras and making large margins from consumables film, chemicals and paper. As late as 1. 97. Kodak commanded 9. GLB_en_urg_01114_images/autourg01114006ID2167359.jpg' alt='Kodak Digital Camera Software' title='Kodak Digital Camera Software' />Kodak Digital Camera Software FreeU. S. 2. 6Rivalry with FujifilmeditJapanese competitor Fujifilm entered the U. S. market via Fuji Photo Film U. S. A. with lower priced film and supplies, but Kodak did not believe that American consumers would ever desert its brand. Kodak passed on the opportunity to become the official film of the 1. Los Angeles Olympics Fuji won these sponsorship rights, which gave it a permanent foothold in the marketplace. Fuji opened a film plant in the U. S., and its aggressive marketing and price cutting began taking market share from Kodak. Fuji went from a 1. Fuji also made headway into the professional market with specialty transparency films such as Velvia and Provia, which competed successfully with Kodaks signature professional product, Kodachrome, but used the more economical and common E 6 processing machines which were standard in most processing labs, rather than the dedicated machines required by Kodachrome. Fujis films soon also found a competitive edge in higher speed negative films, with a tighter grain structure. In May 1. 99. 5, Kodak filed a petition with the US Commerce Department under section 3. Commerce Act arguing that its poor performance in the Japanese market was a direct result of unfair practices adopted by Fuji. The complaint was lodged by the United States with the World Trade Organization. On January 3. 0, 1. WTO announced a sweeping rejection of Kodaks complaints about the film market in Japan. Kodaks financial results for the year ending December 1. Kodaks market share declined from 8. United States, a one year drop of five percentage points that had observers suggesting that Kodak was slow to react to changes and underestimated its rivals. Although from the 1. Fuji and Kodak recognized the upcoming threat of digital photography, and although both sought diversification as a mitigation strategy, Fuji was more successful at diversification. Shift to digitaledit. The Kodak K logo was introduced in 1. The version seen here with the Kodak name in a more modern typeface was used from 1. A revised version was reintroduced in 2. Kodak logo from 2. Although Kodak developed a digital camera in 1. Kodaks photographic film business. In the 1. 99. 0s, Kodak planned a decade long journey to move to digital technology. CEO George M. C. Fisher reached outclarification needed to Microsoft and other new consumer merchandisers. Apples pioneering Quick. Take consumer digital cameras, introduced in 1. Apple label but were produced by Kodak. The DC 2. 0 and DC 2. Overall, though, there was little implementation of the new digital strategy. Kodaks core business faced no pressure from competing technologies, and as Kodak executives could not fathom a world without traditional film there was little incentive to deviate from that course. Consumers gradually switched to the digital offering from companies such as Sony. In 2. 00. 1 film sales dropped, which was attributed by Kodak to the financial shocks caused by the September 1. Executives hoped that Kodak might be able to slow the shift to digital through aggressive marketing. Under Daniel Carp, Fishers successor as CEO, Kodak made its move in the digital camera market, with its Easy. Share family of digital cameras. Kodak spent tremendous resources studying customer behavior, finding out that women in particular loved taking digital photos but were frustrated in moving them to their computers. This key unmet consumer need became a major opportunity. Once Kodak got its product development machine started, it released a wide range of products which made it easy to share photos via PCs. One of their key innovations was a printer dock, where consumers could insert their cameras into this compact device, press a button, and watch their photos roll out. By 2. 00. 5, Kodak ranked No. U. S. in digital camera sales that surged 4. Despite the high growth, Kodak failed to anticipate how fast digital cameras became commodities, with low profit margins, as more companies entered the market in the mid 2. In 2. 00. 1 Kodak held the No. U. S. digital camera sales behind Sony but it lost 6. The film business, where Kodak enjoyed high profit margins, fell 1. The combination of these two factors resulted in disappointing profits overall. Its digital cameras soon became undercut by Asian competitors that could produce their offerings more cheaply. Kodak had a 2. 7 market leading share in 1. In 2. 00. 7 Kodak was No. U. S. digital camera sales with a 9. Canon, Sony, Nikon and others, according to research firm IDC. Also an ever smaller percentage of digital pictures were being taken on dedicated digital cameras, being gradually displaced in the late 2. New strategyedit. The decline of camera film to digital greatly affected Kodaks business. Kodak then began a strategy shift Previously Kodak had done everything in house, but CEO Antonio Prez shut down film factories and eliminated 2. Prez invested heavily in digital technologies and new services that capitalized on its technology innovation to boost profit margins. He also spent hundreds of millions of dollars to build up a high margin printer ink business to replace shriveling film sales. Kodaks ink strategy rejected the razor and blades business model used by the dominant market leader Hewlett Packard in that Kodaks printers were expensive but the ink was cheaper.